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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 409 
Accident time: 12:52 Accident Date: 06/04/2004 
Where it occurred: 34 k SE of Ondjiva on 
road from Chiede to 
Malungo 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 15/04/2001 
ID original source: KO Name of source: MgM 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: AT (unrecorded) Ground condition: route/path 
sandy 
Date record created: 16/04/2004 Date  last modified: 05/07/2005 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: 6380 80990 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Melunga Map series: SE30 
Map edition: K1 Map sheet: 448 
Map name: 1:100,000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
mechanical detonation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 




The following accident report was broadcast on the internet by the demining group involved. 
The text made public is introduced below, edited for anonymity. 
Mine Accident to [Demining group] MPV 
 
Introduction 
On the 6th of April one of [Demining group]'s Mine Proofed Vehicles activated an anti-tank 
mine during road clearance operations. This accident occurred approximately 34 kms south-
east of Ondjiva on a road from Chiede to Malungo wa Shikongo. After an investigation carried 
out on site on the 7th of September the following are the finding and conclusions. 
 
Description 
[Demining group] has been carrying out demining operations in the Chiede area of 
Namacunde District of Cunene, since March 2003. This programme was instigated to help 
with the relocation of IDPs and Refugees in the area following the cessation of hostilities in 
Angola. The programme has mainly consisted of route clearance and manual demining tasks 
to allow safe relocation, and allow WFP to deliver food donations directly to the recipients, 
rather than the nearest administrative centre.  
On the 6th of April 2004 at 1252 hours the WMF Wolf MPV, assisting in route clearance 
operations on the road from Chiede to Malungo wa Shikongo, set off an anti tank mine. The 
location of the accident was 34 kms south east of Chiede. The Wolf was supporting 
[Demining group]'s armoured grader while route-clearance was in progress towards Malungo 




Map Series: SE33 
Edition: K1 
Map Number: 448 
Scale: 1:100,000 
Grid Ref.: 6380 80990 
 
The area where the accident took place is on the northern edge of the Kalahari Desert. The 
soil is very sandy. There is some forestation, though not dense. The land surface is held 
together by grass, green with recent rains. Once the grader removes this surface binding, the 
surface becomes heavy, due to the exposure of soft loose sand.  
 
Assessment 
The Wolf activated a mine under the left rear wheel. Safety distances were being observed, 
no support team members were involved and none were injured. The accident occurred more 
than three kilometres from the nearest habitation, there were no local population that were 
involved. Medical support was on site immediately; the area was made safe to extract the 
driver. The driver of the Wolf was unaffected by this experience. No injuries were sustained.  
Since this accident the driver has continued his tasks as driver/mechanic, driving another 
MPV. This vehicle was being used to help extract the damaged MPV to the main [Demining 
group] workshop in Ondjiva.  
The accident occurred approximately 2550 metres from a previous mine blast on this road. 
On this occasion the armoured grader activated an anti-tank mine under one of its wheels. 
Information had been collected about this area, with the local population reporting that 
recently one boy, a goat and four cows have been killed in mined areas around the road. 
Another vehicle had already activated a mine on this road, some 50 metres from the accident 
site of the armoured Grader. To allow for safe extraction of the Wolf the area around the 
grader was cleared. This allowed the [Demining group] Mechanical Recovery Team to extract 
the grader for delivery to the [Demining group] Workshop in Ondjiva for damage assessment 
and repairs. 
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The driver/mechanic was using his vehicle to prove the area clear behind the grader, clearing 
a lane a minimum of 8 metres width. In normal circumstances an Explosive Vapour Dog 
Detection Team would have cleared the area behind the armoured grader to prove the area. 
The EVDD team had cleared 500 metres in front of the site of the previous mine accident on 
the armoured grader. Unfortunately the EVDD team were not available as operations re-
started on this site. The accident occurred 2250 metres in front of the previous accident. The 
Wolf was being used in the absence of the EVDD team.  
The accident occurred on the extreme left side of the cleared road. The base of the mine was 
measured at 0.9 metres below the level of the surface, prior to grading. After grading the base 
of the mine would be 0.7 metres below the surface. Inspection of the crater revealed no 
evidence of the anti-tank mine. With knowledge of mine used in the area, this mine was in all 
probability a South African No8 anti-tank mine. When activated the mine would then have 
been some 0.5 of a metre below the surface. 
In this case it appears that the mine to pass under the blade of the armoured grader. The 
mine had sunk in the soft sand over the years since being laid, being brought closer to the 
surface by the actions of the [Demining group] armoured grader. The weight of the Wolf III 
Turbo (16 tons) and the soft sand were enough to activate the anti-tank mine, even at a depth 
of 0.5 mts. 
At present the available [Demining group] Explosive Vapour Detection Dog (EVDD) Teams 
were operational on another emergency clearance task in Seles. They returned to this 
operational site immediately. These teams would normally search graded routes and 
windrows (berms) to detect remaining mines and other UXOs. These would then be removed 
and destroyed to allow for clearance status. In this case the Wolf was being used as a 
stopgap until their return. Although not perfect, the method proved effective. 
The Wolf requires some repairs to be carried out to the wheel housing and brakes, as well as 
a new wheel and tyre. [Demining group] has a spare axle, as well as the two spare wheels on 
the Wolf. The Wolf should be operational again shortly. The damaged axle will be sent to 
WMF in Windhoek, Namibia, for the required repairs. 
 
Conclusions 
• The armour deflection of the Wolf's monocoque hull deflected the blast from the anti-
tank mine as expected. 
• The Wolof sustained minimal external damage, with no structural damage. 
• The integrity of the armoured cab was not compromised. This resulted in no injuries 
to the operator. 
• Safety considerations were maintained, [Demining group] SOP's were observed.  
• The accident, though unfortunate, was not unexpected. It is normal to expect 
occasional detonations under the wheels.  




• The operations on this road have been suspended until the EVDD team arrives from 
their previous tasking.  
• There are expected to be more No8's on this route. [Demining group] will employ one 
EVDD Team in front of the armoured grader. When available, one EVDD Team will 
operate behind the grader, in front of the Wolf III Turbo.  
• Wolf III Turbo to continue to continue with its present task, with the added layers of 
clearance in front. 
• EVDD Team to check all areas previously cleared by the present method. 
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• Up date [Demining group]'s SOP's once new methods of clearance have been 
developed for operations in soft sand areas. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the machine 
was being used as a clearance tool, with road tyres and without being approved for this use. 
The internal investigator reports that the machine was being used “to prove the area clear 
behind the grader”. What it proved was that the area was not clear. The demining group 
recognised that the dog team should have been on site, and they were brought to the site 
after the accident, so acknowledging that the method in use was inappropriate. How the Wolf 
was supposed to prove an area “8 metres width” with its tyres is unclear. Presumably it drove 
back and forth, partly on and off the area traversed by the grader. 
The group’s senior management published the report proudly, seemingly unaware that 
clearance by driving a road is not accepted as thorough within humanitarian demining. 
Accordingly, the secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy”.  
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